This annual report describes FHFA's accomplishments, as well as challenges, the agency faced in meeting the strategic goals and objectives during the past fiscal year.
Read about the agency’s 2020 examinations of Fannie Mac, Freddie Mac and the Home Loan Bank System.
Submit comments and provide input on FHFA Rules Open for Comment by clicking on Rulemaking and Federal Register.
As conservator, FHFA is focused on ensuring that each Enterprise builds capital and improves its safety and soundness.
1.
Operate the business in a safe and sound manner.
2.
Promote sustainable and equitable access to affordable housing.
2023 Scorecard
FHFA experts provide reliable data, including all states, about activity in the U.S. mortgage market through its House Price Index, Refinance Report, Foreclosure Prevention Report, and Performance Report.
Source: FHFA
FHFA economists and policy experts provide reliable research and policy analysis about critical topics impacting the nation’s housing finance sector. Meet the experts...
Glossaries
COVID-19 Resources
Joshua Bosshardt (FHFA); Ali Kakhbod (University of California, Berkeley); Amir Kermani (University of California, Berkeley)
We analyze the costs and benefits of financial intermediaries on access to credit using confidential regulatory data on mortgages securitized by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). We find evidence of lenders pricing for observable and unobservable default risk independently from the GSEs. We explain these findings using a model of competitive mortgage lending with screening in which lenders acquire information beyond the GSEs’ underwriting criteria and retain a positive loss given default. The model shows that the discretionary behavior of lenders, relative to a counterfactual in which lenders passively implement the GSEs’ underwriting requirements and price competitively, benefits some borrowers with high observable risk at the expense of the majority of borrowers. Finally, the model suggests that the observed differences between banks and nonbanks are more consistent with differences in their expected loss given default rather than screening quality.