Adaptating to Natural Disaster through Better Information: Evidence from the Home Seller Disclosure Requirement

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## Flood damage = f(flood size, Num. people exposed to risk)



#### Dams and Levees vs. Harnessing Market Forces

- US flood policy focused on former (dams, levees) with little success
  - Complete control of flood water is impossible
  - Attracts more people to floodplain by giving false sense of security

#### Levee Attracts People to Floodplains



Source: St.Louis Post Dispatch (Jul 27, 2003)

Information provision can be an effective alternative?

• 26 states require home sellers to disclose property defects including flood risk

- Is property on Special Flood Hazard Area?
- Binary and straightforward language
- Raise home buyer's risk awareness  $\rightarrow$  Encourage adaptation
  - e.g., safer location, more insurance, better flood-proofing, etc
  - Potential reduction in flood damage

## Can Disclosure Reduce Flood Damage?

- Research Questions
  - 1. Does the disclosure requirement deliver?
    - Estimate a causal effect of the disclosure on housing price
  - 2. How households respond to the disclosure requirement?
    - Estimate the policy impact on self-protection (population net flow) vs. market insurance (flood insurance)
  - 3. What is implication for flood damage?
    - Test if the disclosure policy reduces flood damage

# Exploit Staggered Adoption and Spatial Discontinuity

- Variation
  - Staggered adoption of home seller disclosure requirement at state level
  - Spatial discontinuity in disclosure requirement
- Data
  - Q1/2: Property level sales data, flood insurance policy counts, and census block demographics
  - Q3: Damage records from flood insurance adjuster's report
  - Q3: Construct objective measure of flood history using water gauge records
  - Q1-Q3: Disclosure policy changes from state legislation

Disclosure Affects Home Values and Location Choice

- 1. Price of the properties in high risk area drops by 4.5% (\$15K)
  - Suggests that the policy is binding
- 2. Disclosure policy encourages self protection
  - 7% reduction in population. Vacancy rate  $9.5\% \rightarrow 10.9\%$
  - Negligible change in insurance take-up
  - Less population in high risk area  $\rightarrow$  Less exposure to flood risk
- 3. So what happens to flood damage?



## Simple and Timely Information Delivery

| Property conditions, improvements and additional information:   | YES     | NO       | <u>N/A</u> |
|---|---------|----------|------------|
| 1. Structure:   | _       |          | ,          |
| (a) Previous or surrest moisture conditions and/or water damage?     (b) Any structural defeet?     (c) Any construction, molification, alterations, or repairs made without     required state, city or county building permise? |         | d Re     |            |
| (a) Whether the property is or has been the analyzer of a chaim governed by<br>MB240 600 (a 40.600), construction defat chaims)?  |         | TY-      |            |
| (If soller answers use EURTHER DISCLOSURE IS REDUIRED)  |         |          |            |
| 1 Inde and Connection:  |         |          | /          |
| (a) Any of the improvements being located on unstable or expansive soil?  | 🗖       | B        |            |
| (b) Any foundation sliding, settling, movement, upbeaval, or earth stability problems   |         | _        | -          |
| that have occurred on the property?   |         | ľ        | -          |
| (c) Any drainage, flooding, water seepage, or high water table?   | 🗖       |          | -          |
| (d) The property being located in a designated flood plain?   | 🗖 🗌     | Ľ        | /          |
| (e) Whether the property is located next to or near any known future development?   |         |          | /          |
| (i) Any encrosedments, casements, zoning violations or nonconforming uses?  | L       | 4        | 1          |
| (g) Is the property adjacent to "open range" land?  | 🗀       | 4        |            |
| (If seller answers yes, FURTHER DISCLOSURE IS REQUIRED under NRS 113.065)   |         |          | /          |
| 3. Roof: Any problems with the roof?  | ··· 🖂 🛛 | 4        | ~          |
| <ol> <li>Pool/spa: Any problems with structure, wall, liner, or equipment.</li> </ol>   | ~ H     | H_       | 100        |
| <ol> <li>Infestation: Any history of infestation (termites, carpenter ants, etc.)?</li> </ol>   | ··· 🖵   | -        |            |
| 6. Environmental:   |         |          |            |
| (a) Any substances, materials, or products which may be an environmental nazard such as   |         |          | 1          |
| our not inmitted to, as person, radon gas, una rormaldenyde, ruel or chemical storage tanks,  |         | R        |            |
| contaminated water or soil on the property?   |         | <u> </u> |            |
| (b) This property been the site of a canne involving the previous institutative of recussion protostance<br>where the substances have not been removed from or nemediated on the Property by a certified                          |         |          | /          |
| entity or has not been deemed safe for habitation by the Board of Heath?  | 🗖       | Y        |            |
| ource: Home Seller Disclosure Form (NV)   |         |          | -          |

- Simple and timely information
- Unlikely to be correlated with state's flood risk or history
- 5 "placebo" states have disclosure policy w/o question on flood → useful for robustness checks

#### Damage Function Estimation

- Damage function: mapping from flood size to flood damage
- How would damage function change after the disclosure policy?
- But how to measure flood size?

Construct Flood History Data Using USGS/NOAA Gauge Station Records

- Existing data (e.g., NWS) are prone to subjectivity (Gourley et al. 2013)
- I construct flood history data using USGS/NOAA gauge station records
  - Flood size is measured by recurrence interval (ASCE 1996)
  - Expected number of years for a given flood size to come back
- Calculate the maximum flood size for each gauge-year and match it to community

### Setup: Non-Parametric Damage Function

Per Housing Unit Damage = 
$$\sum_{k} [\beta_1^k F^k + \beta_2^k F^k I + \beta_3^k F^k D + \beta_4^k F^k ID]$$

- $F_{mt}^k$ : 1 if maximum flood size for community *m* at year *t* is in bin *k* 
  - $k \in \{2-10, 10-20, 20-30, 30-40, 40-50\}$
- Allow different slope for treated/control groups for pre/post periods
  - $\hat{\beta}_1^k$ : estimated prob. of damage incurred for k for control group in the pre period relative to baseline (k = 1 2)
  - $\hat{\beta}_2^k$ ,  $\hat{\beta}_3^k$ , and  $\hat{\beta}_4^k$  informs about additional impacts for other groups

Depth-Damage Function

#### Estimation

- Stacked DD: address potential bias from staggered adoption (Goodman-Bacon 2021)
  - Construct data with "clean" controls (not-yet-treated) for each treatment year and stack over (Cengiz et al. 2019)
- To account for mass zeros in damage (Y) variable, separately estimate (1) P(Y > 0) and (2) Y|Y > 0 (Chan and Roth 2022)
  - $\bullet$  (1) is preferred for both generalizability and statistical power

## Disclosure Requirement Flattens the Damage Function



- Increase in damage (pre vs. post) is smaller for the treated group
- Annual expected damage:  $\sum_{k=1}^{5} Pr(K = k) \times \hat{\beta^k} = -2.5\%$ 
  - 33% reduction from baseline (7.4%)



## Effect Size is Larger for Communities with Higher % of SFHA



- Larger exposure to the policy  $\rightarrow$  larger effects (flood disclosure states)
  - No such pattern for placebo states

#### Conclusion

- Growing damage from natural disasters ightarrow adaptation is important
- Key Findings
  - 1. Price of the properties in high risk area drops by 4.5% (\$15K)
  - 2. Population in high flood risk area reduces by 7%
  - 3. Prob. of damage from small/moderate floods reduces by 33% from the baseline
- A policy that eases market friction could foster voluntary adaptation
  - Less HH in flood risky area reduces exposure to floor risk  $\rightarrow$  lower damage
- Questions/comments: seunghoon.lee@missouri.edu

### $\mathsf{Disclosure} \to \mathsf{Less} \; \mathsf{Pop} \; \mathsf{in} \; \mathsf{High}\text{-}\mathsf{Risk} \; \mathsf{Areas}$





### Policy Seems to Induce Meaningful Reduction in Risk Exposure

- Do people choose a marginally different house or move far enough?
  - Important from flood risk exposure perspective
  - Local moves will overestimate the RD estimate



## Why Do We Need Another Damage Function?

- From a policy perspective, damage function at an aggregate level matters
  - e.g., when a city is hit by flood size of X, how large is the damage?
- Numerous engineering studies on property level damage function estimation but hard to learn aggregate damage b/c of data limitations (Meyer et al. 2013)
  - Detailed hydraulic study needed to assess each property inundation but very costly
  - Adaptation measures at each property are very hard to observe
- This paper takes a "reduced-form" approach and directly connects community level flood exposure and damage



## Distribution of Damage (Y) and Floods (X)



### Disclosure Requirement Flattens the Damage Function



• Pre vs. post difference statistically significantly differs only for control group

